

Demand for secondary school characteristics

Evidence from school choice in Hungary

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- Does school quality and school composition affect students' choices?
- Do parents pay attention to the level of the school, or rather to school quality (learning gains)? Are these preferences heterogeneous along (parental) social/educational lines?
- What are the preferences for school (socio-economic) composition?

- Many countries have a system of school choice. School choice gains popularity (e.g. controlled school choice in the US)
- School choice is assumed to increase welfare and even quality (through competition)
- Detrimental effects on equality of opportunity (if disadvantaged students end up in lower quality schools)

- Application data (ordinal preference lists instead of realised choices)
 - Not directly affected by schools' decisions
 - Hungarian case: high-stakes decision
 - Rank-ordered logistic regression
- School choice in upper secondary education
- Distinction between school quality and level

1 Introduction

- Previous literature
- Educational institutions in Hungary

2 Analysis

- Data and method
- Basic model
- First vs subsequent choices
- Control function approach

3 Conclusion

Evidence on determinants of school choice (Hastings et al, Burgess et al) indicates the following determinants:

- Distance to home/work
- School quality
- School denomination (religion/church schools) & pedagogical philosophy
- School composition (ethnic/SES)
- Teachers, school management
- Odds of admission
- Availability of information




Figure: The Hungarian school system

- 1 Students apply to programs (we will observe tracks)
 - Choice among educational programs within tracks within schools
 - Students submit a rank-ordered list of preferences
- 2 Schools rank students
 - Decision on a cutoff entry score
 - Priority for higher test scores
- 3 Assignment in a centralized manner
 - No incentive problems for students while ranking schools
 - A second round of assignment for those not matched (not observed)

- Administrative data for a single cohort (2006)
- Matched data from three datasets (75% of students)
 - Secondary school application register: rank-ordered lists by students
 - National Assessment of Basic Competences
 - Math and reading test scores
 - Individual characteristics
 - Travel time data (public transport)

Individuals maximize a simple (linear) utility function of the form:

$$U_{is} = \alpha_i + \beta_1 TravelTime_{is} + \beta_2 SES_i TravelTime_{is} + \gamma_1 Quality_s + \gamma_2 SES_i Quality_s \\ + \delta_1 Level_s + \delta_2 SES_i Level_s + \zeta_1 SchoolSES_s + \zeta_2 SES_i SchoolSES_s + \epsilon_{is} \quad (1)$$

ϵ_{is} is IID according to extreme value type 1 distribution.

- Individuals have strict preference orderings over schools
- e.g. a choice set with 3 schools A, B, C
 - $A \succ_i B \succ_i C$
 - $U_{iA} > U_{iB} > U_{iC}$
- Probability we observe this ordering is $\pi_{iA}^{A,B,C} \pi_{iB}^{B,C}$, with $\pi_{is}^S = \frac{e^{V_{is}}}{\sum_{j \in S} e^{V_{is}}}$ This is the probability that school s is chosen from set S .

We estimate a value-added model.

$$T_{is}^{10} = \beta_1 T_{is}^8 + \beta_2 (T_{is}^8)^2 + \beta_3 (T_{is}^8)^3 + \delta X_{is} + \theta_s + \epsilon_{is} \quad (2)$$

T: test score in grade 8 or 10

X: gender, SES, parental education, number of books

θ_s : school quality - random effects, shrinkage estimator. We standardise this measure.

- School level: school mean of grade 8 scores (mean of math and reading) (standardised)
- School SES composition: share of parents with (at least 1) secondary education degree (mixed or academic track) (0-1)
- Distance: travel time between towns (public transport) (hours)
- High SES: parents with (at least 1) secondary education degree (mixed or academic track) (0/1)
- Test score: grade 8 test score (standardised)

Feasible choice sets

- Students do not rank all schools
- We only consider schools within 90 minutes of travel time
- We also add schools to the choice set
 - For each student, we determine a radius (based on the most distant school ranked)
 - All schools within this radius (which are always within 90 minutes of travel time) are included in the feasible choice set
 - We only consider tracks the student has ranked explicitly




Figure: Adding schools that were not ranked to the choice set

First analysis: including the 4 main variables: travel time, SES composition, school level and school quality.

		All students
		<i>Coeff (SE)</i>
	Travel time	-3.136*** (0.01)
	School SES composition	-1.748*** (0.02)
	School level	0.860*** (0.01)
	School quality	-0.136*** (0.02)
	R^2	
	N	4240322

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$

Table: Basic model including only the 4 main determinants

First analysis: including the 4 main variables: travel time, SES composition, school level and school quality.

	All students	Academic track	Mixed track	Vocational track
	<i>Coeff (SE)</i>			
Travel time	-3.136*** (0.01)	-3.896*** (0.02)	-3.158*** (0.01)	-2.932*** (0.02)
School SES composition	-1.748*** (0.02)	-1.783*** (0.05)	-1.792*** (0.05)	-1.790*** (0.06)
School level	0.533*** (0.01)	0.651*** (0.01)	0.689*** (0.01)	0.981*** (0.02)
School quality	-0.022*** (0.00)	-0.154*** (0.01)	0.087*** (0.00)	-0.050*** (0.01)
R^2				
N	4240322	1685460	1621676	933186

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$

Table: Basic model including only the 4 main determinants

Baseline model with interaction terms

Now including interaction terms: weak homophily

With quadratic terms: higher SES profile is preferred up to some point

		Rank-ordered logit
		<i>Coeff (SE)</i>
	Travel time	-2.916*** (0.01)
	High SES × Travel time	-0.506*** (0.02)
	School SES composition	-2.206*** (0.03)
	High SES × School SES composition	2.028*** (0.02)
	School level	0.354*** (0.01)
	School level × Test score	0.663*** (0.00)
	School quality	-0.007** (0.00)
	School quality × Test score	0.040*** (0.00)
	R^2	
	N	4206191

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$

Table: Basic model with interaction terms

First vs subsequent choices

The rank-ordered model weighs all choices equally, irrespective of their rank. We now consider the top-n choice for each student. We consider the probability that a school is chosen from the set, excluding higher-ranked alternatives. The rank-ordered logit reduces to a conditional logit model.

In general, preferences become less outspoken, the lower the rank of the choices we explore.

	First choice	Second choice	Third choice	Fourth choice	Fifth choice
	<i>Coeff (SE)</i>	<i>Coeff (SE)</i>	<i>Coeff (SE)</i>	<i>Coeff (SE)</i>	<i>Coeff (SE)</i>
Travel time	-2.983*** (0.02)	-2.857*** (0.02)	-2.914*** (0.03)	-2.926*** (0.05)	-2.911*** (0.07)
High SES × Travel time	-0.572*** (0.03)	-0.539*** (0.03)	-0.526*** (0.04)	-0.443*** (0.06)	-0.350*** (0.09)
School SES composition	-1.855*** (0.05)	-2.175*** (0.05)	-2.321*** (0.06)	-2.577*** (0.09)	-2.885*** (0.14)
High SES × School SES composition	2.359*** (0.04)	2.152*** (0.05)	1.943*** (0.05)	1.787*** (0.07)	1.598*** (0.12)
School level	0.416*** (0.01)	0.343*** (0.01)	0.316*** (0.01)	0.294*** (0.02)	0.332*** (0.03)
Test score × School level	0.755*** (0.01)	0.696*** (0.01)	0.609*** (0.01)	0.541*** (0.01)	0.471*** (0.02)
School quality	0.008 (0.01)	-0.033*** (0.01)	0.001 (0.01)	0.012 (0.01)	-0.011 (0.01)
Test score × School quality	0.043*** (0.01)	0.031*** (0.01)	0.053*** (0.01)	0.051*** (0.01)	0.037** (0.02)
R^2					
N	4206191	4152613	4104868	4071042	4055260

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$

Table: Conditional logit on the top-n choice

Omitted variable bias: school composition variables (SES composition and school level), and school quality, may correlate with other (unobserved) school characteristics.

- School level and SES composition: effect may be overestimated
- School quality: less likely to suffer from bias
- Proposed instruments: level and SES composition of students living in the school's town. No suitable instrument for school quality (yet).

Potential solution: control function approach

- Does not require the problem to be linearized
- Other solutions (Berry inversion, BLP) imply working with aggregated data

Two stages

- First stage: regress endogeneous variables on exogenous ones (including instruments). Save the error terms.

$$Level_s = \alpha Level_s^{instr} + \beta SchoolSES_s^{instr} + \gamma Quality_s + \epsilon_{is} \quad (3)$$

- Second stage: original regression, but including the control function term (i.e. error term from first stage)

Control function approach: results

	Original	CF (level)	CF (SES composition)
	<i>Coeff (SE)</i>		
Travel time	-3.136*** (0.01)	-3.222*** (0.01)	-3.222*** (0.01)
School SES composition	-1.748*** (0.02)		2.580*** (0.08)
School level	0.533*** (0.01)	-0.253*** (0.01)	
School quality	-0.022*** (0.00)	-0.008*** (0.00)	0.029*** (0.00)
Town SES composition		1.274*** (0.05)	
School level (CF)		0.617*** (0.01)	
School SES composition (CF)			-2.342*** (0.08)
Town level			-0.492*** (0.02)
R^2			
N	4240322	4246565	4240322

*** $p < 0.01$; ** $p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.10$

Table: Control function approach: results

Conclusions:

- Preferences for school level overshadow preferences for school quality (learning gains)
- School quality is harder to observe than school level and school composition
- Indications for homophily in terms of socio-economic status

Challenges:

- Implementation of control function approach