Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Hungarian Academy of Sciences Centre of Excellence

Start: 01/25/2018 14:00

End: 01/25/2018 16:00

Location: MTA Research House, conference room nr. K13, ground floor, 4 Tóth Kálmán street, 1097 Budapest

Description

Lecture:

Armando Rungi (IMT Lucca): Global ownership and corporate control networks

Abstract: In this contribution, at first, we introduce a basic network framework to study pyramidal structures and wedges between ownership and control of companies. Then, we apply it to a dataset of 53.5 million of companies operating in 208 countries. Among others, we detect a strong concentration of corporate power, as less than 1% of parent companies collect more than 100 subsidiaries, but they are responsible for more than 50% of global sales. Therefore, we show that the role of indirect control, i.e., through middlemen subsidiaries, is relevant in 15% of domestic and 54% of foreign subsidiaries. Among foreign companies, cases emerge of blurring nationality, when control paths cross more than one national border, in the presence of multiple passports (19.1%), indirectly foreign (24.5%), and round-tripping subsidiaries (1.33%). Finally, we relate indirect control strategies to country indicators of the institutional environment. We find that pyramidal structures arise less likely in the presence of good financial and contractual institutions in the parent's country, as these foster more transparent forms of corporate governance. Instead, parent companies choose indirect control through countries that have better financial institutions, possibly because it is easier to coordinate decisions from remote. Finally, we find that offshore financial centers are preferred jurisdictions for middlemen subsidiaries, probably due to a lower taxation and a lack of financial disclosure.